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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
down. Even with the protection of present state procedures, perhaps some
prisoners have been executed while insane. When dealing with such slim
possibilities of injustice, however, the courts should proceed with caution,
lest the Fourteenth Amendment become an instrument to impede the progress
and workings of judicial administration. "Due process of law requires that
the proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute con-
cept. It is fairness with reference to particular conditions or particular
results."49
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Right to Retain Out of State Counsel in Criminal Proceedings-In Cooper v.
Hutchinson, 184 F. 2d 119, (2d Cir., 1950), the appellants had been tried
and convicted of murder in a state court of New Jersey. Following the con-
viction New York lawyers were secured at the appellant's request to handle
the appeal, which resulted in reversal. The trial judge, however, refused to
permit the out-of-state counsel to handle the case on retrial. The appellants
then sought an injunction in the federal district court to prohibit the trial
judge from proceeding with the trial until he recognized the out-of-state
attorneys, claiming that the trial judge's action deprived them of due process
of law. The district court dismissed the complaint and appeal was made to
the United States Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit. The appellant's
argument was based primarily on the case of U. S. v. Bergamo, 154 F. 2d 31,
where the Third Circuit Court held that the right to counsel in a federal
criminal proceeding included the right to out-of-state counsel. The appellants
contended that since the Bergamo case held this right to be an element of due
process under the Fifth Amendment, it must also be protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The question confronting the court, then, was not
merely whether a man charged with a crime has the right to counsel, but
whether he has the constitutional right to choose his counsel. If such a right
did exist, it would admittedly serve to limit the control of the states over
the persons licensed to practice before its courts. The court, however. de-
clined to face this problem, deciding the case on the grounds that once an
out-of-state attorney has been admitted to try a capital case it is for the
entire "cause," and he can not be arbitrarily removed without depriving his
client of his constitutional rights. "Assuming that these accused persons
could not have claimed representation by out-of-state lawyers as a constitu-
tional right, the representation was granted and may not, without cause,
be taken away."
Refusal of Witness to Testify on Grounds of Self-Incrimination Can Not Be
Used to Prejudice Defendant-In Billed v. United States, 184 F. 2d 394 (D.C.,
1950), the defendants were convicted of carrying on a lottery. Their appeal
was based on the trial court's failure to give proper instructions in sixteen
different instances. One of the instructions requested by the defendant was
to the effect that the failure of certain witnesses to testify on the grounds of
self-incrimination could not be considered as prejudicial to the defendant.
The court not only denied the instruction, but permitted the prosecutor in
his summation to ask the jury to infer that the testimony of these witnesses,
if given, "would be ... damaging to the defendant's ease." This wa; found
to be erroneous, the Circuit Court noting that the right of a witness to refuse
49. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934).
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to te lify on the grounds of self incrimination is one "personal to himself,"
and its exercise should not result in harm to someone else. "His answer, if
given, might conceivably be that he but not the defendant was guilty of the
offense. or it might ' , that both he and the defendant were guilty; or it might
relate entirely to so e other offense."
A Judge's Right in Feder3l Cases to Comment on the Evidence-One of the
instructions given by the c rt in the foregoing Billeci case, which was objected
to by defendant's counsel, contained a quotation from the remarks of the
court in District of Cohembia v. Horning, 47 App. D.C. 413, which had been
approved by the United States Supreme Court in Horning v. District of
Columbia. 254 U. S. 135 (1920). This quotation read as follows: "In a
criminal ease the court cannot peremptorily instruct the jury to find the
defendant guilty. If the law permitted it, I would do so in this case. It is
your duty under your oaths as jurors to accept as correct and be governed
by the exposition of the law which I give you. In conclusion I will say to
you that a failure by you to bring in a verdict in this case can arise only from
a willful and flagrant disregard of the evidence and the law as I have given
it to you, and a violation of your obligation as jurors." The court in the
Bilicci case found this instruction to be error, distinguishing the Horning case
on the grounds that there the facts were not in dispute, since the defendant
testified to the same facts as did the government witnesses, whereas in the
present case there was a vigorous disagreement as to the facts. Thus the
latitude given the trial court the Horning case would seem to be restricted
to those situations where "the testimony of both sides is in agreement and
the only question actually open is one of law."
Another grounds for reversal alleged by the defendants was the charge that
the trial judge in his instructions to the jury "by intonations and gestures,
emphasized principles beneficial to the prosecution and de-emphasized those
things which he said of benefit to the defendants." The court stated that
such actions might well be grounds for reversal, but to be so the defense
counsel must be careful to record fully and accurately what has occurred,
making certain that it is entered in the record at the time of the occurrence.
It is not enough that a general objection be made for the record with the
intention of developing it more fully on appeal. By getting a complete and
accurate statement of the objection in the record the trial court will have
an ample opportunity to fully comprehend the objection and perhaps rectify
any error by a proper instruction to the jury.
Proceedings Under Sexual Psychopath Statute Held Not to Violate Due
Process-Missouri has been one of a small group of states to enact sexual
psychopath legislation in an effort to solve the problem presented by the
chronic sex offender. Other states with similar statutes include Illinois,
California, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Minnesota.
As was the case with the Michigan statute. the Missouri statute was attacked
on the grounds that proceedings under it violated the due process provisions
of the state constitution. The Supreme Court of Missouri, like that of Mich-
igan, found no merit in the defendant's contention. State v. Green, 232 S.W.
2d 897 (Mo. 1950).
The Missouri statute provides that when it appears that a person charged
with a sex crime is a sexual psychopath the prosecuting attorney shall file a
petition requesting that the court hold a hearing on the matter. The defend-
ant is then examined by two physicians, and "if prima facie proof be made
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